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From: Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD <plagnioj@jcrosoft.com>
To: barebox@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH 04/13] boot: invert the secure boot forcing support
Date: Sun, 26 Mar 2017 04:44:55 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1490496304-30850-4-git-send-email-plagnioj@jcrosoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1490496304-30850-1-git-send-email-plagnioj@jcrosoft.com>

Add HAS_SECURE_BOOT as we will add other image format that support secure boot

Signed-off-by: Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD <plagnioj@jcrosoft.com>
---
 common/Kconfig | 12 ++++++++----
 common/bootm.c |  6 +++---
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/common/Kconfig b/common/Kconfig
index f7ff04664..895814ee9 100644
--- a/common/Kconfig
+++ b/common/Kconfig
@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ config HAS_KALLSYMS
 config HAS_MODULES
 	bool
 
+config HAS_SECURE_BOOT
+	bool
+
 config HAS_CACHE
 	bool
 	help
@@ -624,6 +627,7 @@ config BOOTM_FITIMAGE_SIGNATURE
 	prompt "support verifying signed FIT images"
 	depends on BOOTM_FITIMAGE
 	select FITIMAGE_SIGNATURE
+	select HAS_SECURE_BOOT
 	help
 	  Support verifying signed FIT images. This requires FIT images
 	  as described in:
@@ -631,14 +635,14 @@ config BOOTM_FITIMAGE_SIGNATURE
 	  Additionally the barebox device tree needs a /signature node with the
 	  public key with which the image has been signed.
 
-config BOOTM_FORCE_SIGNED_IMAGES
+config BOOT_FORCE_SIGNED_IMAGES
 	bool
 	prompt "Force booting of signed images"
-	depends on BOOTM_FITIMAGE_SIGNATURE
+	depends on HAS_SECURE_BOOT
 	help
 	  With this option enabled only signed images can be booted, unsigned images
-	  are refused to boot. Effectively this means only FIT images can be booted
-	  since they are the only supported image type that support signing.
+	  are refused to boot. Effectively this means only Signed images can
+	  be booted.
 
 config BLSPEC
 	depends on BLOCK
diff --git a/common/bootm.c b/common/bootm.c
index 53311ab1c..885b09f81 100644
--- a/common/bootm.c
+++ b/common/bootm.c
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ enum bootm_verify bootm_get_verify_mode(void)
 }
 
 static const char * const bootm_verify_names[] = {
-#ifndef CONFIG_BOOTM_FORCE_SIGNED_IMAGES
+#ifndef CONFIG_BOOT_FORCE_SIGNED_IMAGES
 	[BOOTM_VERIFY_NONE] = "none",
 	[BOOTM_VERIFY_HASH] = "hash",
 	[BOOTM_VERIFY_AVAILABLE] = "available",
@@ -531,7 +531,7 @@ int bootm_boot(struct bootm_data *bootm_data)
 		goto err_out;
 	}
 
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BOOTM_FORCE_SIGNED_IMAGES)) {
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BOOT_FORCE_SIGNED_IMAGES)) {
 		data->verify = BOOTM_VERIFY_SIGNATURE;
 
 		/*
@@ -635,7 +635,7 @@ static int bootm_init(void)
 		globalvar_add_simple("bootm.initrd.loadaddr", NULL);
 	}
 
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BOOTM_FORCE_SIGNED_IMAGES))
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BOOT_FORCE_SIGNED_IMAGES))
 		bootm_verify_mode = BOOTM_VERIFY_SIGNATURE;
 
 	globalvar_add_simple_int("bootm.verbose", &bootm_verbosity, "%u");
-- 
2.11.0


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  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-03-26  2:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-03-25  8:31 [PATCH 00/13] add efi secure boot support Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD
2017-03-26  2:44 ` [PATCH 01/13] bootm: move open to image_handler Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD
2017-03-26  2:44   ` [PATCH 02/13] boot_verify: use a new error ESECVIOLATION Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD
2017-03-26  7:59     ` Michael Olbrich
2017-03-26  2:44   ` [PATCH 03/13] bootm: make security generic Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD
2017-03-26  2:44   ` Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD [this message]
2017-03-26  2:44   ` [PATCH 05/13] move boot verify to generic code Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD
2017-03-26  2:44   ` [PATCH 06/13] boot_verify: make it modifiable at start time Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD
2017-03-26  8:16     ` Michael Olbrich
2017-03-26  2:44   ` [PATCH 07/13] go: only use it if boot signature is not required Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD
2017-03-26  8:23     ` Michael Olbrich
2017-03-27 11:50       ` Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD
2017-03-26  2:44   ` [PATCH 08/13] boot_verify: allow to force unsigned image to boot Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD
2017-03-26  8:25     ` Michael Olbrich
2017-03-26  2:45   ` [PATCH 09/13] boot_verify: add password request support Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD
2017-03-27  6:11     ` Sascha Hauer
2017-03-26  2:45   ` [PATCH 10/13] efi: add more security related guid for the efivars Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD
2017-03-26  2:45   ` [PATCH 11/13] efi: fix lds for secure boot support Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD
2017-03-26  8:30     ` Michael Olbrich
2017-03-26  2:45   ` [PATCH 12/13] efi: fix secure and setup mode report Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD
2017-03-26  2:45   ` [PATCH 13/13] efi: enable sercure boot support Jean-Christophe PLAGNIOL-VILLARD
2017-03-26  7:57   ` [PATCH 01/13] bootm: move open to image_handler Michael Olbrich

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