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From: Marco Felsch <m.felsch@pengutronix.de>
To: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Cc: "open list:BAREBOX" <barebox@lists.infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/13] am625: support secure loading of full barebox
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2025 09:48:33 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250311084833.5h32rntkvk6ggi5i@pengutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Z8_wg9fWKN4s0vrd@pengutronix.de>

On 25-03-11, Sascha Hauer wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 10, 2025 at 06:40:58PM +0100, Marco Felsch wrote:
> > Hi Sascha,
> > 
> > On 25-02-28, Sascha Hauer wrote:
> > > On K3 SoCs only a small barebox is loaded by the ROM into SRAM. This
> > > barebox then loads the full barebox from SD/eMMC or USB DFU. In a secure
> > > boot environment the full barebox must be authenticated. This series
> > > implements two ways for accomplishing this.
> > > 
> > > First way is to utilize the ROM API to authenticate images. The other
> > > way is to compile a secure hash into the first stage binary and check
> > > if the full barebox image matches the hash. Using the ROM API means
> > > different first stage and second stage images can be combined whereas
> > > hashing binds specific builds together avoiding mix and match attacks.
> > 
> > before having a closer look on your patchset, do we really want to have
> > the 2nd case to be available?
> 
> Yes, as explained to avoid mix-and-match attacks.

Argh.. sorry, I meant the first case, the ROM API one. If the ROM API
allows mix-and-match attacks, we need to mark it as INSECURE. Sorry for
the confusion.

Regards,
  Marco

> > If we really want the 2nd case to be
> > available we should bound it to CONFIG_INSECURE (if not already done).
> 
> Ok, will do.
> 
> Sascha
> 
> -- 
> Pengutronix e.K.                           |                             |
> Steuerwalder Str. 21                       | http://www.pengutronix.de/  |
> 31137 Hildesheim, Germany                  | Phone: +49-5121-206917-0    |
> Amtsgericht Hildesheim, HRA 2686           | Fax:   +49-5121-206917-5555 |
> 



  reply	other threads:[~2025-03-11  8:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-02-28  7:16 Sascha Hauer
2025-02-28  7:16 ` [PATCH 01/13] firmware: always generate sha256sum Sascha Hauer
2025-02-28  7:16 ` [PATCH 02/13] firmware: add function to verify next image Sascha Hauer
2025-03-10 18:37   ` Marco Felsch
2025-03-11  7:35     ` Sascha Hauer
2025-02-28  7:16 ` [PATCH 03/13] ARM: k3: r5: drop loading of separate binaries Sascha Hauer
2025-03-10 18:44   ` Marco Felsch
2025-02-28  7:16 ` [PATCH 04/13] ARM: k3: r5: add proper error handling Sascha Hauer
2025-03-10 18:52   ` Marco Felsch
2025-03-11  8:24     ` Sascha Hauer
2025-03-11  8:50       ` Marco Felsch
2025-02-28  7:16 ` [PATCH 05/13] fip: rework fip_image_open() Sascha Hauer
2025-02-28  7:16 ` [PATCH 06/13] fip: fix wrong function call Sascha Hauer
2025-02-28  7:16 ` [PATCH 07/13] fip: add function to calculate a sha256 over FIP image Sascha Hauer
2025-02-28  7:16 ` [PATCH 08/13] ARM: am625: support hash verification of full barebox Sascha Hauer
2025-03-10 19:22   ` Marco Felsch
2025-03-11  7:53     ` Sascha Hauer
2025-02-28  7:16 ` [PATCH 09/13] ARM: k3: add support for authenticating images against the ROM API Sascha Hauer
2025-02-28  7:16 ` [PATCH 10/13] ARM: k3: r5: delete fip image when it can't be opened Sascha Hauer
2025-02-28  7:16 ` [PATCH 11/13] ARM: k3: r5: Allow to authenticate next image by ROM API Sascha Hauer
2025-03-10 19:26   ` Marco Felsch
2025-03-11  7:54     ` Sascha Hauer
2025-02-28  7:17 ` [PATCH 12/13] scripts/k3img: remove temporary files Sascha Hauer
2025-02-28  7:17 ` [PATCH 13/13] scripts: add k3sign Sascha Hauer
2025-03-10 17:40 ` [PATCH 00/13] am625: support secure loading of full barebox Marco Felsch
2025-03-11  8:12   ` Sascha Hauer
2025-03-11  8:48     ` Marco Felsch [this message]
2025-03-11  9:13       ` Sascha Hauer

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