From: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
To: barebox@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@barebox.org>
Subject: [PATCH 05/11] Documentation: security: clarify the environment section
Date: Mon, 28 Sep 2026 13:27:00 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260928112731.1271094-6-a.fatoum@pengutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260928112731.1271094-1-a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
From: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@barebox.org>
CONFIG_ENV_HANDLING can be problematic, even when the environment isn't
mutable, i.e. it's simply read from external unauthenticated storage.
Clarify that in the docs.
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@barebox.org>
---
Documentation/user/security.rst | 7 ++++---
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/user/security.rst b/Documentation/user/security.rst
index d981d89268c8..9a241b0e2e8d 100644
--- a/Documentation/user/security.rst
+++ b/Documentation/user/security.rst
@@ -140,13 +140,14 @@ In addition, there are alternative methods of accessing the shell like
netconsole, or fastboot. These should preferably be disabled or at least
not activated by default.
-Disabling mutable environment handling
-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+Disabling the non-builtin environment
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Anything done interactively by the shell can also be done automatically by
means of init scripts in the environment. Even without shell support, the
non-volatile variables in the environment could be used to reconfigure
-barebox in an insecure manner.
+barebox in an insecure manner or to influence the command line and device
+tree passed to the kernel on boot.
A secure barebox should thus only consult the environment that it has built
in and not parse an externally located environment.
--
2.47.3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-28 11:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-28 11:26 [PATCH 00/11] Documentation: define a barebox threat model Ahmad Fatoum
2026-09-28 11:26 ` [PATCH 02/11] Documentation: security: clarify development key insecurity Ahmad Fatoum
2026-09-28 11:26 ` [PATCH 03/11] Documentation: security: require signature verification to be pinned Ahmad Fatoum
2026-09-28 11:26 ` [PATCH 04/11] Documentation: security: document trust for builtin devicetree Ahmad Fatoum
2026-09-28 11:27 ` Ahmad Fatoum [this message]
2026-09-28 11:27 ` [PATCH 06/11] Documentation: security: describe shell and environment as trust boundary Ahmad Fatoum
2026-09-28 11:27 ` [PATCH 07/11] Documentation: security: document the barebox update attack surface Ahmad Fatoum
2026-09-28 11:27 ` [PATCH 08/11] Documentation: security: update for barebox dm-verity support Ahmad Fatoum
2026-09-28 11:27 ` [PATCH 09/11] Documentation: security: add anchors for the different sections Ahmad Fatoum
2026-09-28 11:27 ` [PATCH 10/11] Documentation: define a barebox threat model Ahmad Fatoum
2026-09-28 11:27 ` [PATCH 11/11] README, SECURITY.md: link the threat model and security considerations Ahmad Fatoum
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