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charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20260319_145853_037782_B1F3A2B0 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 29.73 ) X-BeenThere: barebox@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: "barebox" X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 2607:7c80:54:3::133 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: barebox-bounces+lore=pengutronix.de@lists.infradead.org X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.2 (2018-09-13) on metis.whiteo.stw.pengutronix.de X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.8 required=4.0 tests=AWL,BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_NONE autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.2 Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 3/5] security: policy: set active policy on boot X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Wed, 08 May 2019 21:11:16 +0000) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on metis.whiteo.stw.pengutronix.de) Hi, On 3/18/26 1:47 PM, Fabian Pflug wrote: > On Wed, 2026-03-18 at 12:54 +0100, Ahmad Fatoum wrote: >> On 3/18/26 12:38, Fabian Pflug wrote: >>> On Wed, 2026-03-18 at 12:28 +0100, Ahmad Fatoum wrote: >>>> On 3/18/26 10:22, Fabian Pflug wrote: >>>>> If init name has been set at compiletime and the policy is available, >>>>> because it is part of the path, then set the active policy to the policy >>>>> selected by compiletime. >>>>> Since this is so early in the bootchain, there is no need to call >>>>> security_policy_activate, because there should not be any registered >>>>> callbacks at this moment in time. >>>>> If no policy could be found, then it will be filled as before by the >>>>> first call to is_allowed. >>>> >>>> The code in is_allowed is: >>>> >>>> if (!policy && *CONFIG_SECURITY_POLICY_INIT) { >>>>         security_policy_select(CONFIG_SECURITY_POLICY_INIT); >>>>         policy = active_policy; >>>> } >>>> >>>> It becomes dead code with your change here as CONFIG_SECURITY_POLICY_INIT >>>> is a compile-time constant, there is no filling on the first call anymore. >>> >>> I also thought about it, but if the initial policy is not part of the compiletime policies, but instead gets added >>> during board setup code, then the change in init will not find the specified policy, resulting in policy being NULL >>> and >>> this code still working. >> >> I can't follow. policy is an argument and CONFIG_SECURITY_POLICY_INIT >> is not settable from any board, so that's dead code now AFAICS. > > policy is the argument, but the argument could be NULL, for example if `IS_ALLOWED` is used in the code. > Then policy is replaced by active_policy, which could also be NULL, if `security_policy_get(CONFIG_SECURITY_POLICY_INIT) > ` during init returns NULL, which is the case, if the policy is not registered at the time of call. > During security_init only CONFIG_SECURITY_POLICY_PATH are registered. So for example, you could add multiple policys > with `security_policy_add` inside your boardcode and have one of them declared as init policy with > CONFIG_SECURITY_POLICY_INIT. Then this path is taken during the first call to `IS_ALLOWED` (after board init) I talked it over with Fabian. I see now what I misunderstood: The policy is selected only if it exists. If it's not registered yet, we still need the later policy select. Still, I feel this complicates the logic more than I'd like. Instead we can factor out the CONFIG_SECURITY_POLICY_INIT logic in is_allowed into security_policy_ensure (or some better name) and then call that explicitly on entry to functions that expect the policy selection to be settled. Cheers, Ahmad > > Kind regards > Fabian >> >> Cheers, >> Ahmad >> >>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Signed-off-by: Fabian Pflug >>>>> --- >>>>>  security/policy.c | 3 +++ >>>>>  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) >>>>> >>>>> diff --git a/security/policy.c b/security/policy.c >>>>> index 85333d9e6f..e2d1b10a78 100644 >>>>> --- a/security/policy.c >>>>> +++ b/security/policy.c >>>>> @@ -235,6 +235,9 @@ static int security_init(void) >>>>>   if (*CONFIG_SECURITY_POLICY_PATH) >>>>>   security_policy_add(default); >>>>>   >>>>> + if (*CONFIG_SECURITY_POLICY_INIT) >>>>> + active_policy = security_policy_get(CONFIG_SECURITY_POLICY_INIT); >>>>> + >>>> >>>> I think I decided initially against this, because there was initially >>>> a Sconfig option against changing the active security policy. >>>> >>>> I believe now a single option is too limiting, it should instead be >>>> a directed graph that explains which policies are reachable from a given >>>> policy. >>>> >>>> Anyways, the change here invalidates the Kconfig help text for >>>> SECURITY_POLICY_INIT. >>>> >>>> I am not fully sure if this change is a good idea, but it needs to >>>> be fixed to be considered. I assume you do this, because checking >>>> the name of the policy doesn't trigger a selection like IS_ALLOWED does? >>> >>> exactly. >>> during device_probe, there is a need to know the current policy name, if there is a policy active. >>> >>> I will have a look into it. >>> >>> Fabian >>> >>>> >>>> Thanks, >>>> Ahmad >>>> >>>> >>>>>   return 0; >>>>>  } >>>>>  pure_initcall(security_init); >>>>> >>>> >>> >> > -- Pengutronix e.K. | | Steuerwalder Str. 21 | http://www.pengutronix.de/ | 31137 Hildesheim, Germany | Phone: +49-5121-206917-0 | Amtsgericht Hildesheim, HRA 2686 | Fax: +49-5121-206917-5555 |